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REGULATING SPERM DONATION: WHY REQUIRING EXPOSED 
DONATION IS NOT THE ANSWER 
VANESSA L. PI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, more than 25,000 children are born in the United States as the 
result of artificial insemination,1 one of the most common forms of assisted 
reproductive technology (ART).2 Donated sperm is usually the crucial element 
in artificial insemination,3 and most sperm is donated anonymously in one of 
the two dozen commercial sperm banks in this country.4 Presently, there is a 
serious lack of meaningful regulation over and accountability on the part of 
sperm banks, and the current system has many flaws. These include incomplete 
medical histories for the donor-conceived child, a risk of consanguinity for the 
child, and uncertainty about donor privacy.5 Because of these flaws, some 
countries and states have, or are considering, legislation that would institute a 
non-anonymous donation6 (referred to as “exposed donation” throughout this 
article) regime. This is a faulty solution because it would cause scarcity of 
donated sperm and other harms to each of the parties involved in the process.7 
This article argues that the harms of abolishing anonymity in sperm donation far 
outweigh any potential benefits; thus states should reaffirm donor anonymity 
and institute the changes proposed in Part V. 
Although there is currently little federal regulation of sperm donation,8 the 
few states that have laws and regulations apply rules of limited scope.9 In 
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 1. See ETHEL SLOAN, BIOLOGY OF WOMEN 401 (Cengage Learning 2001); Jeff Stryker, Regulation 
or Free Markets? An Uncomfortable Question for Sperm Banks, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Nov. 7, 2007, available 
at http://www.scienceprogress.org/2007/11/regulation-or-free-markets/. 
 2. Infertility in Men, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://health.nytimes.com/ 
health/guides/disease/infertility-in-men/assisted-reproductive-technologies.html. Other forms of 
ART are intracytoplasmic sperm injection, in vitro fertilization, in vitro maturation, blastocyst 
transfer, and ooplasmic transfer. Id. 
 3. A couple can instead choose to use the sperm of the male partner in the artificial 
insemination, or use what is referred to by the Food and Drug Administration as a “directed 
donation.” 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(l) (2008). The latter is defined as one to a specific person, where the 
donor knows or is known by the recipient before donation, but does not include a sexually intimate 
partner. Id. 
 4. Stryker, supra note 2. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008). 
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addition to briefly explaining the history and science behind ART and sperm 
donation in particular, Part II of this article discusses the inadequate Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, which focus merely on preventing 
“diseased” sperm from being circulated10 and do little to control the number of 
births per donor or facilitate contact between donor and child regarding genetic 
disorders discovered after insemination. Part II will also present the 
decentralized state regulation, as well as the guidelines of professional 
organizations, with the latter effectively being optional and not legally binding. 
Due to this lack of meaningful government oversight, there are many risks 
and concerns associated with the existing sperm donation process. These risks 
will be presented in Part III. First, the risk of incest and consanguinity11 are 
prevalent with anonymous donation12 since there is no monitoring of the 
number of live births per donor. Also, a donor cloaked in anonymity is unlikely 
and unable to contact children conceived with his sperm should he discover he 
has a serious genetic disorder.13 Similarly, it is nearly impossible for a parent of 
a donor-conceived child to obtain additional information from a donor, should 
the child’s medical condition necessitate it, without knowledge of a donor’s 
identity and whereabouts. Donors may also be found to have diminished 
expectations of privacy,14 especially because of the ability for donor-conceived 
children or their parents to investigate a donor’s identity using modern 
genealogy services.15 Many states are attempting to pass bills calling for more 
identity disclosure in the medical files of women using artificial insemination, as 
well as a requirement that clinics offer the option to donate non-anonymously.16 
In fact, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)17 and some state laws already allow 
access to donor files by court order.18 
Attention from scholars and the current international trend toward 
exposed donation19 may hasten, or at the very least trigger, a similar movement 
in the United States as the solution to the risks just mentioned. As Part IV will 
argue, the answer to the call for regulation of sperm donation is not the outright 
elimination of anonymity. Not only is it logical that requiring exposed donation 
 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See Sunni Yuen, An Information Privacy Approach to Regulating the Middlemen in the Lucrative 
Gametes Market, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 527, 554 (2007) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1). Diseased sperm 
includes sperm that tests positive for HIV and hepatitis. § 1271.1(r). 
 11. Consanguinity is defined as “kinship characterized by the sharing of common ancestors.” 
Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/133242/consanguinity 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 12. Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 15–16 (2007). 
 13. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
 15. See Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 5, 2005, 
at 6. 
 16. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 633(b) (2002). 
 18. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1) and (2) (West 2008) (Colorado’s own Uniform 
Parentage Act (not modeled after the actual new UPA) states that records may be obtained upon a 
court order showing good cause.). 
 19. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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will attract fewer donors, many countries that have taken this route have 
experienced varying degrees of scarcity in donated sperm.20 This may result in 
an undue burden on procreation,21 as well as “fertility tourism”22 which would 
circumvent any U.S. oversight. Exposed sperm donation may also have an 
unsettling effect on donors’ privacy rights and could interfere with donors’ legal 
status as “non-parents” since anonymity is the bedrock on which that status is 
based.23 This “solution” does not balance the interests of donors, donor-
conceived children and the latter’s parents correctly with the need for 
substantive regulation. 
In Part V, this article proposes that the answer to this call for sperm 
donation regulation lies in expanding the reach of progressive regulation 
already enacted by some states. Rather than abolish anonymous donation 
altogether, states should uniformly adopt the UPA, or at the very least enact 
laws clearly setting forth a donor’s status. Also, as suggested by the UPA,24 
states should only allow access to donor information by court order showing 
“good cause.” Lastly, the creation of a national donor and donor-offspring 
registry would ease concerns about consanguinity and incest. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CURRENT REGULATION OF SPERM DONATION 
Assisted reproduction is defined as any means of conception not achieved 
through sexual intercourse.25 ARTs include artificial intrauterine insemination, 
egg and embryo donation, in vitro fertilization and sperm injection.26 ARTs are 
used primarily to assist individuals who are unable to conceive children, 
whether due to the actual infertility of either partner or to the “social structure 
in which [an individual or a couple] self-identif[ies].”27 The use of ARTs is 
growing due to various factors such as the increase in single and same-sex 
parenthood28 and the increasingly common choice by many couples to delay 
 
 20. See e.g., June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building 
Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 519–20 (2006) 
(discussing the shortages in Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands). 
 21. Dennison, supra note 12, at 19 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
 22. See generally Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002). 
 25. American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
171, 175 (2008). 
 26. Id. Intrauterine insemination involves the injection of sperm intro a woman’s reproductive 
tract. Crystal Liu, Restricting Access to Infertility Services: What is a Justified Limitation on Reproductive 
Freedom?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 291, 295 (2009). Egg and embryo donation is donation by an 
individual of their own eggs or sperm, whether or not for consideration or for a particular person. 
American Bar Association, supra note 25, at 176. In vitro fertilization is the “formation of a human 
embryo outside the human body.” Id. at 177. Sperm injection is the injection of a single sperm 
directly into an egg. Catherine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331, 333 (2009). 
 27. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008). The latter occurs when a same-sex couple or a single 
person wishes to reproduce. 
 28. Id. at 30–32. 
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having children until later in life.29 As mentioned, sperm donation is a crucial 
element to many types of ART, such as in vitro fertilization, allowing single 
women, same-sex female couples, and couples with an infertile male to conceive 
children. In fact, the number of children born from sperm donation has doubled 
in recent years.30 Although sperm may be donated by a relative or close friend of 
the couple or individual, often the sperm is donated anonymously through a 
sperm bank or clinic. 
Sperm donors choose to donate for various reasons. Primarily, sperm and 
egg donors are motivated by the monetary compensation,31 which many use to 
pay for college or graduate school, or simply to supplement savings or 
disposable income.32 Others choose to donate for altruistic reasons, such as to 
assist infertile couples or others who are unable to conceive children on their 
own.33 Many banks inquire into individual donor’s motivations during the 
screening process.34 This Part discusses the regulation of sperm donation by the 
FDA, by individual states, by the sperm banks themselves, and by professional 
organizations. 
A. Food and Drug Administration 
The federal government regulates all sperm banks and clinics by making 
compliance with FDA regulations mandatory.35 Its regulation of sperm banks 
focuses on “donor screening, quality processing, and record keeping [with 
the] . . . goal [of] keep[ing] infectious tissue out of circulation.”36 The FDA’s 
regulations cover both anonymous donations and non-anonymous donations.37 
Under §1271, FDA regulation of sperm banks is divided into three areas: 1) 
 
 29. Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the FDCPA is Failing America’s 
Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135, 151 (2008). 
 30. Id. at 33–34 (citing 2005 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and 
Fertility Clinic Reports 3, 61 (2007), available at http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/ ART2005/clinics05.asp). 
 31. Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted 
Reproduction Technology, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 167, n.1 (2008). 
 32. Gail Taylor, Becoming a Sperm Donor (2008), https://knol.google.com/k/gail-taylor/ 
becoming-a-sperm-donor/1oq66jc8zi8jp/4#What_Motivates_a_Sperm_Donor (last visited Dec. 15, 
2008). 
 33. Id.  See also Allison Brown, Money Shots: College Students Profit, Help Infertile Couples by 
Donating Their Sperm and Eggs, The Daily Free Press, http://www.cryobank.com/resources/ 
pdf/News/DailyFreePressJan04.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). 
 34. E.g., How Do You Test and Screen Sperm Donors-Cryos New York, 
http://ny.cryosinternational.com/our-donors/screening.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2008); Sperm 
Donors, Inc., http://www.spermdonorsinc.com/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 35. Sperm donation is regulated under 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008). See Luke A. Boso, The Unjust 
Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. 
REV. 843, 846–49 (2008). 
 36. See §1271.1; Sunni Yuen, supra note 10, at 554. 
 37. Martha A. Wells, Ctr. for Biologics, Evaluation, and Research at the FDA, FDA Update: 
Relevant to Reprod. Establishments, Presentation at American Association of Tissue Banks Annual 
Meeting (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/CbER/tissue/aatb091707mw.pdf. 
Directed donation is defined as one to a specific person, where the donor knows or is known by the 
recipient before donation, but does not include a sexually intimate partner. § 1271.3(l). 
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Establishment, 2) Registration and Product Listing, Donor Eligibility, and 3) 
Current Good Tissue Practice (CGTP).38 
With some exceptions,39 sperm banks and clinics must register with the 
FDA using Form FDA 33556, which asks for very basic information such as the 
center’s physical and mailing addresses, its functions, and the type of tissue(s) it 
maintains.40 As of March 2007, 607 reproductive centers were registered, which 
comprise twenty-four percent of all tissue centers registered.41 Of those 607 
centers, only about eighty-nine list semen as among the tissue being 
maintained.42 The two types of sperm centers registered with the FDA are 
cryobanks, which accept anonymous donations, and andrology labs, which store 
sperm for procedures for intimate couples.43 This paper will focus on the former, 
since that is where the issues presented in Part III arise. 
The FDA’s Donor Eligibility requirements apply to both anonymous and 
directed donations.44 In addition to a summary of records for each semen 
donation, the FDA requires a screening of each donor comprised of a physical 
examination and a donor medical history interview.45 The FDA lists twenty-nine 
risk factors that clinics should look for when screening donors.46 For anonymous 
donations, the FDA requires that donors be tested for diseases like HIV and 
hepatitis while their sperm is frozen and quarantined, to be released six months 
later when certified as “disease-free.”47 Exceptions to the donor eligibility 
requirement include when the donor is a sexually intimate partner of the 
recipient and when additional donations are unavailable due to the donor’s 
infertility or health.48 Those donations exempt from the eligibility requirements 
 
 38. Wells, supra note 37. 
 39. § 1271.15 (listing exemptions such as establishments that use the tissue for nonclinical 
scientific or educational purposes, remove and implant the same tissue in the same patient, or only 
store the tissue). § 1271.15(a)–(c). 
 40. § 1271.22. Examples of tissue types are bone, cartilage, semen, skin, and tendons. § 
1271.3(d). 
 41. Wells, supra note 37. The term “tissue center” appears to be synonymous with 
“establishment,” which is defined as “a place of business under one management, at one general 
physical location, that engages in the manufacture of human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-
based products.” 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(b) (2008). 
 42. Wells, supra note 37. 
 43. Id.  Andrology labs store sperm for use by the donors themselves. “Intimate couples” are 
those with a relationship. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. § 1271.3(n) (defining “donor medical history” as a “document dialog about the donor’s 
medical history and relevant social behavior . . .”). 
 46. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION 
FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS, IV.E. (2008). 
The risk factors include: men who have had sex with men within the preceding five years, persons 
who have injected drugs for non-medical reasons within the preceding five years, and persons who 
have been exposed in the preceding twelve months to known or suspected HIV and/or HIV-infected 
blood. 
 47. Stryker, supra note 2. There is no required quarantine period for directed or known 
donations. Wells, supra note 37. 
 48. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a) (2008). 
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are subject to labeling, which warns the purchaser that, for example, testing for 
infectious diseases was not done.49 
Current Good Tissue Practice requirements “govern the methods used in, 
and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture” of human tissue and 
cells.50 The aspects covered by CGTP requirements range from “recovery” and 
donor screening to storage and distribution.51 There are also exemptions made 
to this section of the regulation, but the establishment seeking such an 
exemption must separately apply for each and provide a proposed alternative.52 
CGTP requirements also include periodic inspections of reproductive 
establishments to evaluate compliance with the donor eligibility procedures and 
record-keeping.53 
In addition to the requirements and regulations just discussed, it is 
important to note that the FDA does not require sperm banks to place limits on 
births to individual donors, or even to report such a number, to track donors’ 
health, or to make information available to children born to sperm donors.54 
B. State Regulation 
Individual states regulate aspects of the ART process related to sperm 
donation by licensing sperm banks, controlling the artificial insemination 
process, and determining parent legitimacy in these situations. Only twenty-
four states have created regulatory legislation addressing the operations of 
sperm banks.55 Some states set forth specific requirements for artificial 
insemination. For example, a state can require that artificial insemination must 
be performed under the supervision of a licensed physician.56 Others set forth 
testing requirements and require licensing and registry of all sperm banks.57 
Most states regulate the parent-child relationship as affected by sperm donation 
by setting forth who are deemed the natural and legitimate parents of a child 
conceived through artificial insemination.58 California makes it a felony for a 
person who knows he has HIV or AIDS to donate sperm.59 
 
 49. § 1271.90(b). 
 50. § 1271.150(a). 
 51. Id. 
 52. § 1271.155. 
 53. § 1271.180. 
 54. Stryker, supra note 2. 
 55. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5(a) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a) 
(2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0041 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5408 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
311.281(1) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1062.1(b)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-
334 (b)(2)(i) (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20179 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1008(1) (2008); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-F:5 (2008); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(1)(ii) (2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 130A-148(d) (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151.1 (West 2008); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 677.370 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-1-38 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105(2)(d) 
(LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3c-2(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 56. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-202 (2008). 
 57. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a) (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0041 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 58. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-102 (LexisNexis 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2008); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-10-201 (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (Deering 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-5 (2008); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 59. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1621.5(a) (Deering 2007). 
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The UPA, in its model form, covers many paternity issues, such as 
voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, genetic testing to determine paternity, 
and paternity proceedings.60 The original UPA, which was drafted in 1973, has 
been adopted by nineteen states.61 Article 5 of the model form provides that 
when a child is conceived through artificial insemination using a donor’s sperm, 
the donor is not considered the child’s father.62 It does this by establishing that 
the married woman’s husband is considered the child’s natural father.63 
Importantly, the original UPA addressed only situations in which the child’s 
mother was a married woman and in which the procedure was performed by a 
licensed physician.64 The amended version of the UPA (new UPA), finalized in 
2002 and only adopted by eight states thus far, 65 specifically addresses 
reproductive technology issues. Whereas “[t]he original version of the UPA 
exempted most sperm donors from parental liability,” the new version’s model 
form goes further by stating that a “donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
means of assisted reproduction.”66 Thus, according to the commentary, the 
donor cannot sue to establish his parental rights nor can he be required to 
provide child support.67 Importantly, the new UPA does not limit this principle 
to situations involving a married woman and does not require that a licensed 
physician perform the artificial insemination.68 Also, both versions of the UPA 
contain a provision allowing an inspection of paternity records upon a court 
order for “good cause shown.”69 
Because it addresses ARTs specifically and in a more modern context, the 
following analysis focuses on the new UPA in noting deviations between the 
versions that individual states have incorporated into their statutes and the 
actual new UPA language. Some states do not include the language in Section 
702 that states that a donor is not considered the parent of a child conceived 
through ART.70 Others have transferred that exact language to their own UPA 
statutes.71 Some have retained the “good cause shown” standard for 
insemination records,72 while others do not mention that records may be 
 
 60. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002). 
 61. LAURENCE C. NOLAN & LYNN D. WARDLE, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 247 
(Wm. S. Hein Publishing 2005). 
 62. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. A 
Few Facts About the Uniform Parentage Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2008). The bill proposing 
adoption in New Mexico died on adjournment. S.B. 147, 48th Legis., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008). 
 66. Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological Paternity, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2008) (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002) and commentary). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 20 (1973) with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002). 
 70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-633 (2008). 
 71. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 2008). 
 72. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (LexisNexis 2008) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-633 (2008). 
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released by court order.73 Many states have adopted both of these relevant 
aspects of the new UPA.74 Among the states that have not adopted the UPA, 
some have independently chosen to incorporate either or both of the relevant 
provisions of it into their own statutes.75 
States that have not adopted the new UPA often inconsistently and 
incompletely address the issues of a donor’s parental status and access to donor 
records. For example, an appellate court in California held that parents of an 
ART-conceived child and the child herself could compel the production of 
documents so long as relevant and necessary to their action against a sperm 
bank for selling sperm that allegedly was contaminated with kidney disease.76 A 
Florida court and a Maine court have also not recognized a sperm donor to be 
the parent of an ART-conceived child, and thus held that the donor did not have 
parental rights.77 
C. Sperm Banks 
To a certain extent, sperm banks are self-regulating in that some choose to 
place limits and rules upon themselves, likely recognizing the lack of actual, 
meaningful federal or state regulation. The banks that choose to self-regulate set 
up policies “to improve the overall efficacy of the sperm donation system.”78 For 
example, Cryogenic Laboratories claims to track and monitor each donor and 
their sperm to determine, among other things, the geographic distribution of the 
donor’s offspring.79 Similarly, Cryos International limits donor offspring in a 
particular region to one in 32,000.80 California Cryobanks opts to perform 
 
 73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8-702 (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (Vernon 
2008). 
 74. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-54 and 14-20-60 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-702 and 
78B-15-619 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.705 and 26.26.610 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 14-2-902 and 14-2-819 (2008). 
 75. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.62(5)(c) (2008) (Minnesota statute stating that a sperm donor cannot 
claim to be a child’s biological or legal parent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97(D) (LexisNexis 2008) 
(Ohio law also stating that a sperm donor is not a parent, and has no parental rights or 
responsibilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (2008) (Virginia also establishes that “a donor is not 
the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1) 
and (2) (West 2008) (Colorado’s own Uniform Parentage Act, not modeled after the actual new UPA, 
states that records may be obtained upon a court order showing good cause.). 
 76. Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). (The court 
considered two factors in its decision: that the bank had told donors that non-identifying 
information could be disclosed to purchasers and that there were compelling state interests at stake 
in this case.). 
 77. Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So .2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003 
ME 130, 834 A.2d 922 (Me. 2003). 
 78. Omar Hasan, Amber Johnson, Shira Lipton & Rachel Turow, New Ways of Making Babies: The 
Biology, Ethics, and Policy of Infertility–What Policies Govern Sperm Donation?, 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/reprotech/New%20Ways%20of%20Making%2
0Babies/spermpol.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
 79. Id. 
 80. First Steps-Cryos New York, http://ny.cryosinternational.com/for-parents.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
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genetic screening, setting it apart from other banks.81 Because this is still self-
regulation overseen by no one, many banks choose to become members of 
private organizations, which have their own policies. 
D. Private Organizations 
Professional organizations attempt to govern important aspects of the 
sperm donation process by publishing standards and guidelines aimed at 
adequate screening, control over children per donor, and monitoring of a 
donor’s genetic and medical history. However, as these are institutions that 
sperm banks may choose to be associated with, these guidelines are effectively 
non-binding and merely suggestions. The following three professional 
organizations have published non-binding, voluntary guidelines for sperm 
banks and clinics. 
1.  American Society of Reproductive Medicine 
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has published 
several useful guidelines that address some of the most important issues in 
sperm donation. For example, the ASRM recommends establishing a system for 
ongoing monitoring of a donor’s health status, even after donation.82 It also 
suggests a limit of twenty-five live births per sperm donor for every population 
area of 800,000.83 However, banks are not required to report births and it is 
estimated that, in fact, only 40% of births are actually reported.84 Lastly, ASRM 
advises parents to disclose to their children the details of their conception, 
though it opposes any additional regulation of the industry.85 Although the 
ASRM may discipline a member through expulsion, a call for resignation, or 
other action,86 membership in the ASRM is otherwise purely voluntary. 
2.  American Association of Tissue Banks 
The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) Standards for Tissue 
Banking relates to donor screening, emphasizing the usefulness of genetic 
testing.87 Its mission is “to establish and promulgate standards to provide tissue 
banks with performance requirements intended to prevent disease 
 
 81. Donor Selection-California Cryobank, http://www.cryobank.com/Why-Use-Us/Donor-
Selection/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). 
 82. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2002 Guidelines for Gamete and Embryo 
Donation: A Practice Committee Report, 11 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S5 (2002). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Large Groups of Half Siblings, Donor Sibling Registry Blog, July 18, 2008, http:// 
www.donorsiblingregistry.com/DSRblog/?p=55 (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
 85. Stryker, supra note 2 (A spokesperson for the ASRM has stated that “[m]ore regulation of 
sperm banking is a solution in search of a problem”). The basis for this opposition is that more 
regulation gives up “important autonomy and privacy at great economic expense.” Id. 
 86. ASRM Disciplinary Policy, http://www.asrm.org/Professionals/Membership/ 
disciplinary_policy.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2008). 
 87. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TISSUE BANKS, STANDARDS FOR TISSUE BANKING 21–32 (Richard J. 
Kagan, M.D., ed., 1998). 
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transmission.”88 All member institutions are required to comply with the 
mandatory standards, but accreditation by the AATB is merely “strongly 
recommended” and not required to operate as a tissue bank.89 There is neither 
mention of limits on distributions per donor nor of ongoing monitoring of a 
donor’s health. 
3.  American Fertility Society 
The American Fertility Society’s (AFS) 1990 guidelines also emphasize the 
importance of the genetic history of donors.90 It recommends that records of the 
genetic history or testing of the donor be made available—upon request and on 
an anonymous basis—to the recipient and any resulting children.91 Like the 
ASRM, the AFS suggests a pregnancy limit per donor.92 Specifically, it 
recommends ten pregnancies per donor, or under ten if recipients are members 
of an isolated subgroup of the population.93 
4.  Donor Sibling Registry 
Although not a professional organization like the three above-mentioned 
associations, the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) acts in a quasi-regulatory manner 
by adding more transparency and illuminating some of the problems with the 
current system. DSR is a website that serves donors, donor-conceived children, 
and their parents. As of December 2008, DSR had 22,819 members.94 Donors and 
donor-conceived children are able to sign up using the number assigned to the 
donor by a sperm bank.95 When multiple users sign up using the same donor 
number, a “match” is made.96 More commonly, these matches occur between 
half-siblings, but a number of donor-offspring matches have resulted.97 As of 
December 2008, over 5,000 matches had been made on the DSR website.98 The 
largest match between half-siblings is a startling 105 matches!99 Not only do 
these numbers illustrate the consanguinity risks to be discussed below, they 
 
 88. Id. at Introduction. 
 89. Id. 
 90. American Fertility Society, New Guidelines for the Use of Sperm Donor Insemination: 1990, 53 
FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S8 (Supp. 1 1990). 
 91. Id. at S4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  “Isolated subgroup” is not defined in the Guidelines, nor do they provide any 
explanation as to this modification to the limit.  However, an example of an “isolated subgroup” 
might be if the population using the donor insemination was limited to certain individuals because 
the clinic is the only one in a small town. 
 94. Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/index.php (last visited Dec. 
16, 2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Fairfax Cryobank Listings on Donor Sibling Registry, 
http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com/ListRegistry.php?keyword=&dpTypeID=1&faID=15&dpIde
ntityNumber=&usUserName_startswith=&usTypeID=&faCity_contains=&faStateID=&faCountryID
=&dpDateCreated_isgreaterthan=&doSearch=Search+Registry (last visited Dec. 16, 2008). 
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show that if such a registry were mandated and inclusive of all donations 
nationwide, it would be effective in solving that problem. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH UNREGULATED SPERM DONATION 
Unregulated anonymous sperm donation raises many concerns and 
problems, particularly the health risks to donor-conceived children and their 
offspring, such as genetic disorders and consanguinity, and a diminishment of 
donor privacy. Current regulation by the FDA, individual states, and 
professional organizations lacks uniformity and fails to provide real solutions to 
these problems. This Part will also introduce the faulty solution some states and 
countries have chosen, which is analyzed further in Part IV. 
A.  Health Concerns 
Anonymous sperm donation presently causes a risk of incest among 
unknowing half-siblings conceived using the same donor’s sperm, which can 
lead to consanguinity. Also, limited access to information about a donor’s health 
after donation leaves donor-conceived children with an incomplete medical 
history. 
1.  Consanguinity 
As mentioned above, sperm banks are primarily self-regulating entities.100 
Aside from voluntary guidelines issued by the major professional organizations, 
sperm banks are not required to report the number of live births per donor.101 
Thus, it is entirely possible that one sperm donor can be the biological parent of 
numerous children.102 This concern is compounded when one considers that 
these children may well grow up in the same geographic area surrounding the 
bank where their mothers obtained the sperm used in the ART. Even more 
troublesome is the fact that there are particular characteristics that result in a 
few frequently requested donors,103 and a bank can divide up a single donation 
to sell the sperm to numerous recipients.104 In fact, a search on The Donor 
Sibling Registry shows that “one particular donor, number 1476 of the Fairfax 
Cryobank, is the biological father of at least 36 children all born between 2002 
and 2007.”105 Although some individual clinics have chosen to limit the number 
 
 100. Dennison, supra note 12, at 15 (citing Lucy Frith, Gamete Donation & Anonymity: The Ethical 
and Legal Debate, 16 HUMAN REPROD. 818, 821 (2001)). 
 101. Banks are merely required to report the number of live births generally. 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-1 
(2009). 
 102. Id. (citing Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a Health Hazard, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/health/ 
06opin.html?_r=1). Recently, thirty lesbian women in Adelaide, Australia were inseminated by 
sperm from the same man. In another case, one man’s sperm produced twenty-nine children in the 
same city in Australia. Unregulated Sperm Donation Causes 30 Women to Be Impregnated by Same Man, 
FOX NEWS, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,434511,00.html. 
 103. Nordic donors are some of the most popular because of their blond hair and blue eyes, 
tendency to be tall and to hold advanced degrees. Rob Stein, Mad Cow Rules Hit Sperm Banks’ Patrons, 
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A01. 
 104. Dennison, supra note 12, at 15 (citing Grady, supra note 104). 
 105. Id. 
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of donations or births per donor,106 there is no requirement that clinics share 
information regarding these statistics.107 
2.  Access to Medical History 
Although the FDA requires comprehensive donor screening for infectious 
diseases, it does not require genetic testing or even a procedure for continued 
monitoring of a donor’s health.108  Although a donor can consent to allowing a 
sperm bank to release non-identifying medical information to a recipient, that 
would still cover only disorders and diseases up to that point. Should a donor 
later develop a serious medical condition that may have been genetically passed 
on to an ART-conceived child, he is not required to contact either the sperm 
bank, the recipient-mother, or the child. 
B.  Donors’ Concerns About Their Privacy 
Donor privacy is becoming less absolute, and it appears that a state could 
require disclosure of information that a donor assumed, and that a sperm bank 
promised, would be anonymous. In fact, at least in California, a donor’s 
constitutional right to privacy can be diminished by another person’s actions.109 
A California Court of Appeals case in 2000 determined the level of protection 
given to a sperm donor’s level of privacy.110 Commentators describing the 
court’s holding have reported that “donor information from an anonymous 
donor could be disclosed under certain circumstances.”111 Although other states 
have not addressed this issue, most other states are like California in that the 
state’s constitutional right to privacy provides even more privacy than federal 
laws, so the Johnson analysis could be extrapolated to other states.112 By creating 
the possibility that a state might require disclosure, the Johnson decision affects a 
donor’s privacy in two ways: by establishing that a donor “can have a 
diminished expectation of privacy and that contractual protection of a donor’s 
information may not be sufficient to prevent its disclosure.”113 
1.  Diminished Expectations of Privacy 
The Johnson court held that the donor’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
was “substantially diminished” for two reasons.114 First, the sperm clinic 
routinely informed its donors that non-identifying information and medical 
 
 106. E.g., The Sperm Bank of California, http://www.thespermbankofca.org/pages/ 
page.php?pageid=2 (last visited Dec. 16, 2008). 
 107. Dennison, supra note 12, at 16. 
 108. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2008). 
 109. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 110. Id. (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000)). 
 111. Id. Since the case did not involve a donor-conceived child seeking access to information, the 
court did not elaborate on the circumstances under which a court may disclose such information 
pursuant to the UPA. Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National Donor 
Gamete Registry, DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. (forthcoming 2009). 
 112. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
 113. Id. at 22. 
 114. Id. (quoting Johnson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1055). 
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history may be disclosed to purchasers, which lessened a donor’s expectation 
that such information would never be revealed.115 Second, the donor’s own 
conduct diminished his expectation of privacy in his identity because his very 
frequent donations amounted to a “substantial commercial transaction likely to 
affect the lives of many people.”116 
Clinics are increasingly offering to potential purchasers more donor 
information, such as interests, education, baby photographs, and audio 
interviews.117 Donors knowingly provide this additional information and thus 
are aware that it is made available to purchasers.118 
In addition, it is increasingly difficult to maintain anonymity in the modern 
age. Another recent development that may diminish a donor’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is the very real possibility that donor-conceived children 
and their parents may be able to discover the donor’s identity. Recently, a 
fifteen-year old boy in the United Kingdom traced his sperm donor’s identity on 
the Internet using a genealogy DNA-testing service.119 The boy used a DNA-
testing service to match up with two other people with same paternal line, 
which is determined by the gene variants carried by a person’s Y 
chromosome.120 The similarity between their Y chromosomes suggested that 
they must have the same father, grandfather, or great-grandfather, and the two 
matches shared the same last name.121 Already knowing his donor’s birthplace 
and date of birth, the boy purchased from an online service the names of 
everyone born in the same place on the same day, which revealed one person 
with that particular last name.122 Thus, any internet-savvy teenager with a few 
hundred dollars could likely make the same discovery. 
2.  Weak Contractual Protection of Donor Privacy 
The Johnson court also found that the contract between parents and clinics 
expressly prohibiting disclosure of the donor’s identity under “any and all 
circumstances” cannot enhance the donor’s expectation of privacy because it is 
contrary to public policy.123 This implies that the child’s best interests, including 
health, consanguinity, and psychological well-being, are likely an overriding 
concern.124 The possibility that a donor-conceived child may be able to discover 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 23 (citing California Cryobank Donor Catalog, California Cryobank, http:// 
www.cryobank.com/catalog/indexb.CFM; Donor Information, Fairfax Cryobank, http:// 
www.fairfaxcryobank.com/donorinfo.aspx?menu=4&turn=on). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Motluk, supra note 15. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Dennison, supra note 12 (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist. 2000)). 
 124. Id. 
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a donor’s identity, mentioned above, is also of concern in this area, as clinics are 
less confident in their ability to guarantee complete anonymity.125 
C.  Recent State and International Trends 
Within the past decade, both states and foreign countries have moved 
away, or attempted to move away, from complete anonymity for sperm donors. 
States have gradually begun to consider bills proposing to either list a donor’s 
identity in the mother’s medical chart126 or to give donors the option to allow a 
clinic to reveal their identity to the donor-conceived child.127 Internationally, 
anonymous donation is available in fewer and fewer places,128 while some 
countries are instead releasing a donor’s identity when donor-conceived 
children reach a certain age.129 
1. State Trends 
Recently, states have attempted to reduce donor anonymity. First, the 
Johnson case mentioned above allows access to a donor’s information in certain 
circumstances.130 Although legislative proposals have primarily been futile, they 
nonetheless represent a growing interest in recognizing the above-mentioned 
concerns as being as important as, or even overriding, a donor’s privacy right. A 
Virginia bill introduced in 2006 attempted to require that all unrelated sperm 
donors be identified in the medical chart of any unmarried female purchasers.131 
Had it not been voted down, this would in effect have prohibited anonymous 
donation for unmarried women, one of the main groups that benefit from sperm 
donation. Michigan also proposed requiring licensed fertility clinics to provide 
donors with the option to sign a contract authorizing the clinic to reveal the 
donor’s information to the ART-conceived child.132 
As described previously, the UPA allows access to a donor’s medical file 
upon court order for good cause.133 This likely includes cases of medical 
necessity for donor-conceived children.134 In addition to those states that have 
adopted the UPA, several states have enacted legislation that would permit 
donor-conceived children to obtain donor information on court order, based on 
a satisfactory showing of “good cause” or a similar standard.135 “Good cause” 
may be satisfied when a child or parent needs access to the donor’s information 
 
 125. Id. at 24 (citing Betsy Streisand, Who’s Your Daddy?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 2006, 
http://usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/060213/13donor.htm). 
 126. H.B. 187, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006). 
 127. H.R. 5605, 93rd Leg., 2006 Sess. (Mich. 2006). 
 128. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 129. E.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 
 130. Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
 131. H.B. 187, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006). 
 132. H.R. 5605, 93rd Leg., 2006 Sess. (Mich. 2006). The bill never reached a vote. 
 133. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 632 (2002). 
 134. Hollace S.W. Swanson, Donor Anonymity In Artificial Insemination: Is It Still Necessary?, 27 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 151, 188 (1993). 
 135. Dennison, supra note 12, at n80. 
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for early detection of a genetic disease or for location of a relative for a 
“lifesaving transplant procedure.”136 
2.  International Trends 
Responding to the rise in ART development and use, many countries have 
enacted legislation that regulates sperm donation. Some have chosen to 
eliminate anonymous donation altogether, whereas others are requiring 
disclosure of a donor’s information when a donor-conceived child reaches the 
age of majority. The United Nations (U.N.) has even taken steps acknowledging 
a child’s right to know her parents. 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and parts of Australia do not permit 
anonymous donation.137 These jurisdictions have prohibited anonymous 
donation in order to encourage children to contact their donors when they reach 
the age of majority.138 The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 takes a different approach by requiring disclosure once a 
donor-conceived child comes of age.139 At eighteen, the child can request 
identifying and non-identifying information about the donor.140 However, this is 
only allowed with the donor’s consent.141 Britain has also instituted a limit on 
creating ten families per donor.142 Similarly, in New Zealand the Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 provides mechanisms for 
accessing information by both donors and donor-conceived children, and 
established a registry for this purpose.143 Those children have access to the 
information on the donor at age eighteen, or at sixteen or seventeen with a court 
order.144 The Act’s guiding principles include that donor-conceived children 
should know of their genetic origins and be able to access information about 
those origins.145 
In 1989, the U.N. recognized the right to know one’s parents as a 
fundamental human right in its Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).146 
Although nearly 200 countries have ratified the CRC, the United States has yet 
to do so.147 In fact, it and Somalia are the only two U.N. member states that have 
 
 136. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 875 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
 137. Dennison, supra note 12, at 9. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 92; Ken Daniels and Alison 
Douglass, Access to Genetic Information by Donor Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy, and Law in New 
Zealand, 27 MED. L. 131 (2008) (for children conceived after August 2005). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Sept. 20, 1990, available at http:// www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ 
b/k2crc.htm. 
 147. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF 
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, June 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. 
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not ratified the CRC.148 Although the United States has given no reason as to 
why it has chosen not to ratify the CRC, one possible cause is the hesitance of 
conservative organizations that believe ratification would have implications for 
issues like abortion, education, and discipline.149 Other critics believe that the 
CRC undermines a parent’s roles and that it is “anti-parent” and “anti-
family.”150 If any of these possible reasons change or are overcome, ratification 
by the United States of the CRC could lead to erosion of the anonymous 
donation process. Also, as of his inauguration, President Barack Obama had not 
expressed whether he intends to ratify the CRC.151 
IV. WHY EXPOSED DONATION IS NOT THE ANSWER 
Recent state and international trends as well as commentators152 suggest 
that information disclosure and donor–child/parent contact solve the problems 
discussed in Part III. As shown, some countries have even gone the way of an 
outright ban on anonymous donation,153 and proponents of that view believe 
that the environment in which ART came about decades ago, which encouraged 
secrecy about these issues, has changed.154 However, allowing only exposed 
donation creates far greater problems, such as scarcity of donations and other 
harms to donors, the medical profession, and society. As discussed in Part V, 
infra, a combination of the new UPA and some comprehensive regulation of the 
sperm bank industry may be far more effective. 
A.  Scarcity 
Banning sperm donors from donating sperm anonymously would result in 
fewer donations overall. In fact, requiring exposed donations elsewhere has 
actually led to fewer sperm donations in those countries. The previously 
mentioned U.K. regulations have caused scarcity, 155 which has lead to “pressure 
to accept donors with suboptimal characteristics, long waiting lists, and the 
development of a fresh semen market on the Internet, often with unscreened 
semen.”156 Other countries have experienced shortages as a result of similar 
legislation.157 Requiring exposed donation in the United States could cause 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Devanshi P. Patel, Should Teenagers Get LoJacked Against Their Will?: An Argument for the 
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 47 HOW. L.J. 429, 435 n.16 (2004). 
 150. Id. (Senator Jesse Helms, who said: “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child is incompatible with the God-given right and responsibility of parents to raise their 
children.”). 
 151. Policy Issues, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 152. E.g., Dennison, supra note 12; Swanson, supra note 134. 
 153. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 154. Swanson, supra note 134, at 190. 
 155. Grady, supra note 102. In fact, each year Britain needs at least 500 donors to provide sperm 
to about 4,000 women. In 2006, only 307 donors registered; this shortage may have been due to the 
anonymity ban in 2005. Also, in the past, for every 100 men solicited, about five to ten would choose 
to donate; now, the number has decreased to fewer than five. Id. 
 156. Ilke Turkmendag, Robert Dingwall & Therese Murphy, The Removal of Donor Anonymity in 
the U.K.: Silencing of Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L J. OF L., POL’Y & FAM. 283, 284 (2008). 
 157. E.g., Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 519–20; Yuen, supra note 10, at 545–48. 
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scarcity here as well, which could lead to negative effects worse than the 
problems with the current process. 
1.  Why Exposed Donation Would Lead to Scarcity 
Studies have shown that about half of sperm donors would not donate if 
anonymity were banned.158 Although a donor may donate with the non-
pecuniary intentions to help women and couples unable to have children any 
other way, he may not be comfortable with the idea that a child conceived with 
his sperm may contact him at any unexpected moment in his life. The donor 
may fear that a relationship, or even contact, with the child may interfere with 
the donor’s later family life.159 Despite knowing what his sperm may be used 
for, a donor may be psychologically disturbed when confronted with knowledge 
of an actual offspring conceived with his sperm.160 He may even feel 
embarrassment over his previous decision to donate,161 particularly if he 
changed his mind over time. A donor may even fear or resent that an additional 
legal obligation, such as child support, has been thrust upon him or that he will 
be subject to paternity suits or even that the child will bring an inheritance 
claim.162 In fact, if anonymity is the primary reason or factor that donors are not 
legal parents,163 banning anonymous donation may lead to courts deciding that 
donors are legal parents of donor-conceived children. 
2.  The Negative Effects of Scarcity Due to Exposed Donation 
Should the United States choose to address the current lack of sperm bank 
regulation by banning anonymous donation, the scarcity that is likely to result 
would have many far-ranging consequences that affect both women and couples 
seeking sperm and donor-conceived children. First, the forced exposed donation 
and resulting shortage of donated sperm may place undue burdens on 
procreation and force childlessness, especially since it may cause an increase in 
the cost of sperm.164 The fact that ART falls under the constitutionally-protected 
right to privacy in reproductive choice explains the current laissez-faire 
approach to regulation,165 as regulators may fear that more regulation may 
violate that right. However, as Part V will point out, the United States can reach 
a middle ground between inadequate regulation and intrusion on this important 
right. It is also arguable that a married couple’s constitutionally recognized right 
to procreate is broad enough to encompass ART.166 Additionally, if one can 
accept ART as a “public good,” the ban and scarcity may cause dignitary harms 
 
 158. Cahn, supra note 111, at 16 (citing Eric D. Blyth, Lucy Frith & Abigail Farrand, Is it Possible to 
Recruit Gamete Donors Who Are Both Altruistic and Identifiable?, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY J. S21 (2005)). 
 159. Swanson, supra note 134, at 180. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Dennison, supra note 12, at 21. 
 163. See generally Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological 
Paternity, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2008). 
 164. Dennison, supra note 12, at 19 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
 165. Id. at 10. 
 166. Daar, supra note 27, at 51–57. 
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due to the denial of equal access to public goods on the basis of immutable 
characteristics.167 
Other consequences address the very real likelihood that people will find a 
way to circumvent this undesirable ban on anonymous donation, or seek sperm 
where it is not in short supply. The shortage may encourage “middlemen” to 
respond to the excess demand by facilitating cross-border transactions, 168 which 
could result in “fertility tourism.”169 Does it make sense to protect the parties to 
sperm donation by regulating sperm banks in a way that results in the parties 
going elsewhere to participate in the process, to places where donation may be 
even less regulated than in the United States?170 Scarcity may also cause women 
and couples to resort to informal practices, such as asking a friend for sperm.171 
Those situations could result in the friend being deemed a legal parent of the 
child, since courts often acknowledge non-parent status for a friend-donor only 
when it very closely resembles a “conventional, anonymous sperm donation.”172 
This would require at least an oral contract exempting the friend from child 
support obligations and other responsibilities and obligations.173 
Lastly, this scarcity may even exacerbate the current problem of 
consanguinity. It is unlikely that sperm donation would cease altogether 
because some donors would likely continue to donate despite having to expose 
their identities. This could result in more donations per donor, in order to meet 
the excess demand arising from the shortage. Thus, the chances of many 
children conceived from one donor residing in one geographical area would 
greatly increase the chances of incest. 
B.  Donor Privacy 
As mentioned above, a donor’s expectation of privacy may be diminished, 
allowing sperm banks to disclose the identity or even medical history of 
donors.174 It appears that if donors are no longer permitted to withhold their 
identity, a court may choose to draw the privacy line even further away from 
total protection of donor medical information. Thus, a court could allow access 
to a donor’s complete medical file, which includes all medical history as well as 
other private information. 
 
 167. Id. at 57–62. For example, a “public accommodation” is defined in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to include the “professional office of a health care provider.” American with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 121821(7)(F) (2008). 
 168. Yuen, supra note 10, at 541–43. 
 169. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 5–8. “Fertility tourism” occurs when those seeking 
fertility services, such as sperm, travel to, or purchase from, other countries for those services or 
products. See generally id. 
 170. The opposite effect may result if the United States continues to allow anonymous donation: 
others may choose to come to this country to obtain these services. 
 171. Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 20, at 4. 
 172. See generally Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. 2007). Bailin, supra note 66. 
 173. See Ferguson, 855 A.2d at 124; Bailin, supra note 66. This would also help to ensure that the 
donor’s right to privacy is not diminished and thus that the Johnson reasoning (supra Part III.B) does 
not apply. 
 174. See generally Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
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C.  Harm to Parents 
When a donor’s identity is known to a donor-conceived child and her 
family, parents may fear that the donor’s role in the child’s life may cause an 
interruption in their own family life or in the parent’s rearing of the child.175 A 
parent may also experience embarrassment at others knowing that her child was 
conceived through ART, because it may imply infertility or an alternative 
lifestyle which the parent may not have disclosed to everyone she knows.176 It 
could also be problematic in paternity hearings if the exposed donor appeared 
to assert parental rights; currently this fear would be irrational because most 
states do not allow a sperm donor to assert such rights, at least so long as the 
donation was anonymous.177 
D.  Harms to ART Providers 
The medical profession “has incentives to maintain donor anonymity” for 
several reasons.178 First, a dramatic decrease in donations may have economic 
consequences for ART providers. Scarcity and thus fewer purchases may cause 
many sperm banks to go out of business. This results in a smaller number of 
sperm banks, and thus a greater concentration of donated sperm. As mentioned 
above, this will also magnify the consanguinity problem. Also, these providers 
may suffer reputational harms should they no longer be able to assure their 
donor patients that their information will be kept confidential.179 Also, banning 
anonymity may negatively affect physician autonomy in that the providers will 
no longer be able to independently decide when identifying and medical 
information should be disclosed. 
 
E.  Harms to Society 
 
The state’s interest in the institution of marriage180 causes it to “favor 
conduct that furthers marriage.”181 The use of ART promotes marriage in 
various ways, such as by bringing couples psychologically closer together 
through the conception and raising of a child.182 It also allows more couples to 
have children, which in turn leads to martial stability.183 By making it more 
difficult for couples to conceive children when conventional options are 
unavailable, a ban on anonymity would keep this important interest from 
extending to all citizens. 
 
 175. Swanson, supra note 134, at 180. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Dennison, supra note 12, 18–19. 
 178. Swanson, supra note 134, at 182. 
 179. See id. This could even be deemed an unconstitutional “interference with the obligation of 
contracts” by Congress since it would violate the contract between current donors and their sperm 
banks, which promise anonymity. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 183. 
 183. Id. 
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V. PROPOSAL: UPA & UNIFORM SYSTEM OF LAWS REGULATING SPERM BANKS 
This article’s proposal solves the concerns with current regulations in a 
way that does not cause the problems that a ban on anonymity would create. In 
fact, in its 2007 regulations the European Union took similar action, by requiring 
member states to register sperm donations without imposing any rules relating 
to anonymity.184 An effective way to enforce the following framework would be 
for the United States to pass a comprehensive ART Act,185 which would fill in 
the gaps left by states that have not adopted the new UPA and by the lack of 
attention paid to the other concerns addressed above. 
A.  Requiring Sperm Banks to Report Births 
A way to lessen the risk of incest among donor-conceived children is to 
require sperm banks to report, or at least track, births. Special attention should 
be paid to the number of births per donor. This could be done through state 
licensing laws or through FDA regulation.186 This would not infringe on donor 
privacy rights in any way, as it can still be done through a bank-created registry 
using randomly assigned donor identification numbers.187 It would merely be a 
way to tie separate donor-conceived children to a single donor. Banks would be 
required to enter the information each time a donation is made. These children 
would then be able to contact the sperm bank to determine if another donor-
conceived child is a half-sibling before engaging in a physical relationship. In 
the United Kingdom, before anonymity was banned altogether, donor children 
could contact the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s Registry to 
verify that they were not biologically related.188 A similar database should be 
created in the United States, modeled after the voluntary Donor Sibling Registry 
(DSR).189 In fact, at a recent symposium, the three largest sperm banks 
“advocated for the creation of a voluntary registry run by a non-profit entity.”190 
It is important to note that this article advocates a federal approach to 
sperm bank regulation because state implementation of a registry is replete with 
problems. Even if uniform legislation is created, individual states may modify it 
 
 184. Daryl Lindsey, Danish Sperm Bank Deposits to Remain Tax-Free and Anonymous, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
0,1518,532388,00.html.  Also, France does not guarantee a child’s right to know his or her origins. 
Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting Approaches Under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J. LAW, 
POL’Y & FAM. 137, 154 (2007). 
 185. This note does not address any potential federalism issues. 
 186. For this to be done via FDA regulation, sperm donation and/or banking would need to fall 
under the Food and Drug Act. 
 187. These numbers could at some point be tied to the donor’s social security number or other 
identifying information, so as to avoid one man donating at several banks to circumvent the 
donation limit. 
 188. Dennison, supra note 12, at 16 (citing The HFEA Register For Donors, Human Fertilisation & 
Embryology Authority, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1213.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008)). 
 189. Donor Sibling Registry, http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2008); 
see supra Part II.D.4. 
 190. Pamela Foohey, Potential National Voluntary Gamete Donor Registry Discussed at Recent Health 
Law Symposium, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 597, 599 (2008). 
Pi Macro 2.doc 8/3/2009  10:38:41 AM 
 REGULATING SPERM DONATION 399 
before enactment, much like the UPA, thus causing it to vary drastically.191 
Multiple state registries may make it nearly impossible for a child to utilize the 
system without knowing exactly in which state his mother purchased the 
sperm.192 Also, an additional oversight entity may be required to ensure 
cooperation and coordination among states.193 Lastly, having fifty registries 
would likely result in nationwide duplicative effort.194 
A simpler solution to the consanguinity problem is DNA and parentage 
blood testing, which is currently a readily available resource. Donor-conceived 
children worried about consanguinity could contract with a testing laboratory to 
determine whether they share the same sperm donor. A huge flaw in each of 
these solutions is that in order for them to be effective, both children must know 
that they were conceived using donor sperm; otherwise, they would not even 
consider checking for consanguinity. It is worth taking a moment to note the 
importance of this disclosure. Knowledge of the circumstances of their 
conception allows donor-conceived children to utilize the resources available, 
and those proposed here, to have a complete medical history and to be aware of 
the risk of incest. Because it can be an unsettling event for any donor-conceived 
child, studies have shown that the earlier in life the child is told, the better.195 
This enables the child to adapt well and to seek support from other donor-
conceived children. It also avoids feelings of betrayal should the child 
accidentally find out later in life. However, there are some parents that will still 
choose to keep their child’s donor-conception a secret, either to protect their 
children or because they fear it will diminish the father’s role.196 Thus, the most 
successful way to avoid the consanguinity concern is to require reporting or 
recording of births per donor, and even enforcing a limit per geographical area 
as the AFS guidelines already recommend.197 This will ensure that, even if some 
children remain unaware of their status, there is at least a limit on donor births 
per geographic area. 
B.  Allowing Access to Information by Court Order 
Giving donor-conceived children and their parents access to donor 
information would address situations where a child needs to know relevant 
medical history.198 The court order required would only be given “for good 
cause,” and would allow access only to the most relevant information and never 
to identifying information when non-identifying information is sufficient. This is 
 
 191. Cahn, supra note 111, at 19. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Sperm Bank Information, Tell Donor Children Early in Life, July 15, 2008, 
http://www.spermbankinformation.com/2008/07/15/tell-donor-children-early-in-life/; Science 
Daily, Children Born After Donor Insemination Should Be Told As Soon As Possible About Their 
Conception, July 7, 2008, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080707100203.htm. 
 196. Patricia Wen, To Tell the Truth, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/ 
health/articles/2008/02/04/to_tell_the_truth/. 
 197. Fertility Society, supra note 90, at S4 . 
 198. E.g., if a child needs information regarding a possible genetic illness or a more complete 
medical history. 
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the exact standard used by the UPA and the Johnson court. As mentioned, the 
“good cause” standard has been construed to encompass circumstances such as 
when detection of a genetic disease or location of a relative for a transplant is 
necessary.199 Other state courts have not given any attention to what constitutes 
“good cause,” so an ideal comprehensive regulatory scheme should enumerate 
situations where it would be appropriate to release information. This specificity 
would alleviate a donor’s concerns that his privacy will be encroached upon in 
situations where the need for the information is not a medical necessity. Also, 
unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States should not 
allow automatic disclosure of information when a donor-conceived child 
reaches the age of majority, as it could cause further diminishment of a donor’s 
privacy rights by putting donors on notice that information will be disclosed. 
Lastly, instituting a national registry as discussed in the previous subsection 
could be used to encourage donors to contact their donor-conceived children 
should the donor develop a genetic disease after donation. If necessary to 
preserve anonymity, this communication could take place through the sperm 
bank used for donation. Admittedly, there may be disadvantages to a registry, 
such as an increase in the cost of ARTs and a possible decrease in donations.200 
However, if a streamlined, national registry is used, the cost per donation or per 
purchase may be minimal. Also, as the next section will show, if all states take 
steps to recognize that a donor is not a legal parent, donors should not be 
deterred simply because there will be a registry, especially since this article 
proposes a truly anonymous registry. 
C.  Establishing Donors’ Non-Parent Status 
All states should set forth that a donor is not considered the legal parent of 
a child conceived with his sperm. This will not only assuage donors’ concerns 
that donating will expose them to legal and financial responsibilities to a child, 
but will also ease parents’ worries about donor interference. Although at least 
nineteen states have adopted the previous version of the UPA, which states that 
a when a child is conceived through artificial insemination using a donor’s 
sperm, the donor is not considered the child’s father, 201 very few have adopted 
the new UPA which specifically applies to ART and both married and 
unmarried users of donated sperm.202 Each state should either strive to adopt 
the new UPA or at the very least enact a statute setting forth a donor’s status. 
Some state courts have recognized this by finding non-parental status when a 
truly anonymous donation has taken place. For example, in 2007 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to treat a donor as a legal father because 
the parties had “preserved enough of the trappings of a conventional, 
anonymous sperm donation.”203 However, in the ever-evolving world of ART, 
this limited common law is not sufficient; specific statutory language is needed. 
 
 199. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 875 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2000). 
 200. Foohey, supra note 190. 
 201. Paul Bailin, Ferguson v. McKiernan: The Problematic Concept of Technological Paternity, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2008) (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973)). 
 202. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 702(2002). 
 203. Bailin, supra note 201, at 425 (citing Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121 (Pa. 2007)). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal and state regulation of sperm donation lags far behind the 
constantly evolving science of ART, causing uncertainty, fear, and even medical 
harm. The donor is unsure of his legal relationship to a child born from artificial 
insemination using his sperm. The child worries that she will be unable to 
confirm her genetic history, or that her donor has developed a genetic disorder 
since donating. Any time two donor-conceived people enter into an intimate 
relationship, they are taking a risk that they may be biologically related and that 
any resulting children will suffer the consequences. The solution is not to 
remove an aspect that makes the artificial insemination process available and 
efficient—anonymity. It is to address the gaps and flaws in current regulation 
with practical, specific and clear mandates that do not discourage donation. In 
the meantime, this article’s proposal will hopefully result in an increase in the 
ratio of donors who voluntarily release their identities to anonymous donors,204 




 204. Foohey, supra note 190, at 598. 
